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I. INTRODUCTION
How can anyone be precluded from asserting a claim by a
statute of limitations which expires before the discovery of the
injury? How can anyone charged with the responsibility of ad-
ministering justice allow such an absurdity?1
This was the reaction of Chief Justice Celebrezze in Amer v. Akron
City Hospital2 to the fate of the plaintiff, whose wife was the victim of a
hospital's negligent administration of radiation therapy. The plaintiff-
husband was barred from bringing suit for loss of consortium and medical
expenses by a statute of limitations which required the action be brought
1Amer v. Akron City Hosp., 47 Ohio St. 2d 85, 93, 351 N.E.2d 479, 485 (1979);
see also Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952)(Frank,
J., dissenting). Judge Frank stated:
Except in topsy-turvy land, you can't die before you are conceived,
or be divorced before ever you marry, or harvest a crop never planted,
or burn down a house never built, or miss a train running on a non-
existent railroad. For substantially similar reasons, it has always
heretofore been accepted, as a sort of legal 'axiom,' that a statute of
limitations does not begin to run against a cause of action before that
cause of action exists, i.e., before a judicial remedy is available to the
plaintiff. Id. (footnotes omitted).
2 47 Ohio St. 2d at 93, 351 N.E.2d at 479.
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within two years of the termination of the doctor-patient relationship.
The ill effects of the alleged malpractice did not manifest themselves
until well after the termination of the doctor-patient relationship.3
An injustice similar to that described occurs when the family of a
wrongful death victim is precluded from asserting a wrongful death claim
by a two year statute of limitations which expires before the discovery
that the death was the result of a wrongful act. This injustice is imposed
as a matter of law, however, by Section 2125.02 of the Ohio Revised Code,
Ohio's wrongful death statute of limitation.4
The focus of this Note will be on the statute of limitation applicable
to the Ohio wrongful death statute.5 This statute requires that any claim
3 Id. at 87, 351 N.E.2d at 481.
4 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2121.02 (Baldwin 1987). The statute provides:(A)(1) An action for wrongful death shall be brought in the name
of the personal representative of the decedent for the exclusive benefit
of the surviving spouse, the children, and the parents of the decedent,
all of whom are rebuttably presumed to have suffered damages by
reason of the wrongful death, and for the exclusive benefit of the other
next of kin of the decedent.
(2) The jury, or the court if the action is not tried to a jury, may
award damages authorized by divisions (B) and (C) of this section, as
it determines are proportionated to the injury and loss resulting to
these beneficiaries by reason of the wrongful death and may award
the reasonable funeral and burial expenses incurred as a result of the
wrongful death. In its verdict, the jury or court shall set forth sepa-
rately the amount, if any, awarded for the reasonable funeral and
burial expenses incurred as a result of the wrongful death.(3) The date of the decedent's death fixes the status of all benefi-
ciaries of the action for purposes of determining the damages suffered
by them and the amount of damages to be awarded. A person who is
conceived prior to the decedent's death and who is born alive after his
death is a beneficiary of the action.
In determining the amount of damages to be awarded, the jury or
court may consider all factors existing at the time of the decedent's
death that are relevant to a determination of the damages suffered
by reason of the wrongful death.(b) Compensatory damages may be awarded in an action for wrong-
ful death and may include damages for the following:(1) Loss of support from the reasonably expected earning capacity
of the decedent;(2) Loss of services of the decedent;
(3) Loss of the society of the decedent, including loss of compan-
ionship, consortium, care, assistance, attention, protection, advice,
guidance, counsel, instruction, training, and education, suffered by
the surviving spouse, minor children, parents, or next of kin;
(4) Loss of prospective inheritance, to the decedent's heirs at law
at the time of his death;
(5) The mental anguish incurred by the surviving spouse, minor
children, parents, or next of kin.
(C) A personal representative appointed in this state, with the
consent of the court making the appointment, may, at any time before
or after the commencement of an action for wrongful death, settle
with the defendant the amount to be paid.
(D) All actions for wrongful death shall be commenced within two
years after a decedent's death.
5 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02(D) (Baldwin 1987). It reads: "All actions for
wrongful death shall be commenced within two years after a decedent's death."
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for wrongful death be brought within two years of the date of death.
Application of the discovery rule6 to the wrongful death statute would
allow an action to be brought within two years of discovering that the
death was the result of a wrongful act.
The customary application of the discovery rule to bodily injury and
malpractice actions, but not to wrongful death actions, can result in harsh
inequities. To best explain the possible inequities involved in this judi-
cially limited application of the discovery rule, the following situations
are presented as an illustration. In all the situations below, Herbert is
the victim of the wrongful act, Henrietta is Herbert's spouse, and Healthy
Hospital is the wrongdoer.
Situation 1 - Just before their wedding, Herbert entered Healthy
Hospital for some tests. Herbert had been experiencing a tingling feeling
in his fingers and toes. Doctors at Healthy Hospital neglected to run a
battery of tests that would have revealed that Herbert was suffering from
a nervous disease which was curable if treated early. Herbert's tingling
feeling disappeared as quickly and mysteriously as it appeared. Herbert
and Henrietta discovered the hospital's negligence on or about their twen-
tieth wedding anniversary when symptoms of the disease again mani-
fested themselves. Herbert and Henrietta may bring a negligence action
against Healthy Hospital if the action is commenced before their twenty-
second anniversary, i.e., within the applicable statute of limitations.7
Situation 2 - Same scenario as Situation 1, except that upon discovery,
Herbert refuses to bring a lawsuit and waste the little time he has left
in an all-consuming court battle. Herbert dies as a result of the disease
three years after he discovered Healthy Hospital's negligence. Henrietta
may bring a wrongful death action despite the fact that Herbert failed
to bring a claim against Healthy.8 Henrietta would have the opportunity
to recover.
Situation 3 - The same scenario as Situation 1, except that the disease
mysteriously progresses at a rapid rate, but could have been successfully
treated with early diagnosis. Herbert dies on their fifth anniversary. On
what would have been their twentieth anniversary, Henrietta discovers
that Herbert would not have died if Healthy Hospital's doctors had not
negligently failed to diagnose and treat Herbert's disease. Absent the
discovery rule, Henrietta would be barred from bringing suit for failure
to commence the action within the required two years.9 Henrietta would
be precluded from recovery before she even knew the opportunity to re-
cover existed. Healthy Hospital and its doctors would never be held ac-
countable for their negligence.
6 The discovery rule provides that the statute of limitation on an action would
not start to run until the party entitled to bring an action discovers or reasonably
should have discovered that (1) he or she has been injured, and (2) the injury is
the result of the wrongful or negligent action(s) of the defendant. Oliver v. Kaiser
Community Health Found., 5 Ohio St. 3d 111,449 N.E.2d 438 (1983). See generally
66 O.JUR.3D Limitations and Laches § 94 (1964).
7 See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
8 See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
9 See supra note 4.
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Situation 4 - Same scenario as Situation 3, except that Healthy Hos-
pital takes deliberate steps to prevent Herbert and Henrietta from dis-
covering their negligence. Henrietta discovers the wrongful nature of
Herbert's death fifteen years after Herbert's death and twenty years after
Healthy's negligence. Henrietta would still be barred from bringing suit
because she failed to commence the action within two years of Herbert's
death. This result occurs despite the fact that the hospital took deliberate
steps to conceal their negligence.10
In each situation, Healthy Hospital's negligent act was equally se-
vere. In each situation, Herbert and Henrietta were unaware of any
possible negligence on the part of the hospital. The only difference was
that in Situations 3 and 4, Herbert suffered the additional misfortune of
dying from Healthy Hospital's wrongful act many years before the wrong-
ful nature of the act was discovered.
This Note will review the development of both the wrongful death
statute and the discovery rule. Next, a discussion of how other states
have dealt with this issue will be presented. An outline of the various
approaches and how they might be utilized by members of the Ohio legal
and judicial communities will follow. The Note will conclude with a rec-
ommendation that Ohio reject its longstanding adherence to an archaic
rationale that has prevented application of the discovery rule in wrongful
death action and that Ohio remedy this inequity by allowing the discovery
rule to operate for these claims.
A. Perspective on the Nineteenth Century Statutory Development
The present Ohio wrongful death statute has its origins in nineteenth
century English law. The English wrongful death statute, enacted in
184611 and commonly referred to as Lord Campbell's Act, created a cause
of action for wrongful death. Until that time the English common law
did not recognize actions for wrongful death 2 . Essentially, the Act pro-
vided: (1) a plaintiff can bring an action based on wrongful act, neglect,
or default, (2) the act, neglect, or default must be such that the decedent
would have had a cause of action had death not ensued, (3) the recovery
could be had even though the wrongful act could be a felony, (4) the action
is brought by the executor of administrator for the benefit of the wife,
husband, parents and child of the decedent, and (5) the action must be
commenced within one year of the decedent's death. 3 The provisions of
10 See infra note 128.
11 Lord Campbell's Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. Ch. 93. [hereinafter Lord Campbell's
Act].
12 Baker v. Bolton, 1 Campb. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808); see also S.M.
SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 1:2 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter
SPEISER].
13 Lord Campbell's Act. See also Ohio Legal Center Institute, Reference Manual
for Continuing Legal Education, WRONGFUL DEATH Vol. 129, at 1.02 (1982) [here-
inafter OLCI Manual].
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the Ohio wrongful death statute enacted in 1851 were very similar to
those of Lord Campbell's Act.14
A very succinct summary of why the common law rule against wrong-
ful death actions developed as it did in England and how American courts
adopted the rule was expressed by Justice Harlan in Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc.15 Justice Harlan said:
One would expect, upon an inquiry into the sources of the
common-law rule, to find a clear and compelling justification
for what seems a striking departure from the result dictated
by elementary principles in the law of remedies. Where existing
law imposes a primary duty, violations of which are compens-
able if they cause injury, nothing in ordinary notions of justice
suggests that a violation should be nonactionable simply be-
cause it was serious enough to cause death. On the contrary,
that rule has been criticized ever since its inception, and de-
scribed in such terms as 'barbarous.' Because the primary duty
already exists, the decision whether to allow recovery for vi-
olations causing death is entirely a remedial matter. It is true
that the harms to be assuaged are not identical in the two
cases: in the case of mere injury, the person physically harmed
is made whole for his harm, while in the case of death, those
closest to him - usually spouse and children - seek to recover
for their total loss of one on whom they depended. This differ-
ence, however, even when coupled with the practical difficulties
of defining the class of beneficiaries who may recover for death,
does not seem to account for the law's refusal to recognize a
wrongful killing as an actionable tort. One expects therefore,
to find a persuasive, independent justification for this apparent
legal anomaly.
Legal historians have concluded that the sole substantial
basis for the rule at common law is a feature of the early
English law that did not survive into this century - the felony-
merger doctrine. ... The doctrine found practical justification
in the fact that the punishment for the felony was the death
of the felon and the forfeiture of his property to the Crown;
thus, after the crime had been punished, nothing remained of
the felon or his property on which to base a civil action. Since
all intentional or negligent homicide was felonious, there could
be no civil suit for wrongful death.
The first explicit statement of the common-law rule against
recovery for wrongful death came in the opinion of Lord El-
lenborough sitting at nisi prius, in Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp.
493, 170 Eng.Rep. 1033 (1808). That opinion did not cite au-
thority or give supporting reasoning, or refer to the felony-
14 OLCI Manual, supra note 7, at 1.04. Compare Lord Campbell's Act, 1846, 9
& 10 Vict. Ch. 93 with 43 Ohio Laws 117 (Ohio's original wrongful death statute).
15 Moragne v. States Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970)(Harlan, J., concurring).
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merger doctrine in announcing that '[i]n a civil Court, the death
of a human being could not be complained of as an injury.'
[citation omitted]. Nor had the felony-merger doctrine seem-
ingly been cited as the basis for the denial of recovery in any
of the other reported wrongful-death case since the earliest
ones, in the 17th century ....
The historical justification marshalled for the rule in Eng-
land never existed in this country. In limited instances Amer-
ican law did adopt a vestige of the felony-merger doctrine, to
the effect that a civil action was delayed until after the criminal
trial. However, in this country the felony punishment did not
include forfeiture of property; therefore, there was nothing,
even in those limited instances, to bar subsequent civil suit.
Nevertheless, despite some early cases in which the rule was
rejected as 'incapable of vindication,' American courts gener-
ally adopted the English rule as the common law of this country
as well. Throughout the period of this adoption, the courts failed
to produce any satisfactory justification for applying the rule
in this country. 16
This historical perspective undermines the foundation for the common
law rule against wrongful death actions. It also challenges the premise,
which will be discussed in greater detail later, that wrongful death stat-
utes are in derogation of common law.
B. Modern Wrongful Death Statutory Interpretation
The cases cited in this section serve two purposes. First, these cases
indicate the modern interpretation of Ohio's wrongful death statute of
limitations. Second, they demonstrate some of the inequities that result
from the interpretation of the limitation provision.
In Sabol v. Pekoc, Jr.17, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the
two year statute of limitations applicable to the wrongful death provision
was not an ordinary time limitation upon the remedy, but an essential
element of the right to bring the action. 8 Mary Sabol worked as a janitress
on the defendant's property and died of work-related injuries. The de-
fendant fraudulently represented to the administrator of Mrs. Sabol's
estate that the defendant's mother was the actual owner of the property.
The defendant encouraged the administrator to bring suit and repre-
sented that his mother's insurance would cover any judgment. After the
two year statute of limitations had expired, it was discovered that the
property actually belonged to the defendant. 19 The administrator's suit
was dismissed as being barred by the two year statute of limitation pro-
vision of Section 2125.02(D).
-6 Id. at 381-85 (citations omitted).
1? 148 Ohio St. 545, 76 N.E.2d 84 (1947).
'
8 Id. at 552, 76 N.E.2d at 88.9 Id. at 549, 76 N.E.2d at 85.
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The Sabol court made particular note of the fact that the right con-
ferred by the wrongful death statute did not exist at common law.2 0 As
a right created solely by statute, it must be applied strictly in accord with
its essential terms.21 The statutory language requiring the action to be
brought within two years of the decedent's death expressed an "integral
element of the right of the action itself . . . , a condition precedent to
bringing the action.
'22
The "condition precedent" language of the Sabol opinion poses trouble
for any wrongful death plaintiff for two reasons. First, a plaintiff will be
barred from bringing a suit two years after the date of death, despite
active concealment on the part of the defendant. Second, the fact that the
cause of action will not exist unless brought within two years could pos-
sibly place the action outside the protection of the Ohio Constitution's
"open court/right-to-a-remedy" provision, Section 16, Article 1.23
The case of Klema v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital of Youngstown,24 illus-
trates the inequities among different types of wrongful death cases. In
Klema, the decedent died four days after anesthesia was negligently ad-
ministered and a wrongful death action was subsequently brought within
two years required by Section 2125.02(D).25 The defendant-hospital con-
tended that the applicable time limitation should have been Section
2305.11 of the Ohio Revised Code, which required that actions for mal-
practice be brought within one year of accrual. 26 The court conceded that
had the decedent survived and brought suit, Section 2305.11 would clearly
have provided the applicable time limitation. Pointing to the well estab-
lished rule that the wrongful death action brought under Section 2125.01
was "completely distinct from that which accrued to the party directly
injured," the Klema court held one-year time limitation applicable to
decedent did not apply to the plaintiff.2 7 The Klema court stated:
20 Id. at 552, 76 N.E.2d at 88.
21 Id.
22 Id. See also Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. v. Hine, 25 Ohio St. 629
(1874). In 1872, the first amendment to the wrongful death statute raised the
maximum recovery to $10,000 and omitted the two-year statute of limitations
provision. The next amendment, in 1880, restored the two-year period of limi-
tation. The death in Hine occurred before the 1972 amendment omitting the time
limit but the action was commenced after the 1872 amendment. The Hine court
concluded that the omission did not have the effect of extending the time in which
the action could be brought. It also interpreted the time provision as establishing
a condition precedent to bringing the action.
2 Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides: "All courts shall be
open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his land, goods, person, or
reputation, shall have a remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice
administered without denial or delay."
2 170 Ohio St. 519, 166 N.E.2d 765 (1960). See also Koler v. St. Joseph's Hosp.,
69 Ohio St. 2d 477, 432 N.E.2d 821 (1982).
m Klema, 170 Ohio St. at 519, 166 N.E.2d at 767.
26 Id. (citing Karr v. Sixt, 146 Ohio St. 527, 67 N.E.2d 331 (1946)); May Coal
Co. v. Robinette, 120 Ohio St. 110, 165 N.E. 576 (1929); Mahoning Valley Ry. v.
Van Alstine, 77 Ohio St. 395, 83 N.E. 601 (1908).
27 Klema, at 525, 166 N.E.2d at 766; see also Koler, 69 Ohio St. 2d at 479, 432
N.E.2d at 823.
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Where an alleged negligent act was such as would have, if
death had not ensued, entitled a person to maintain an action
therefor, a cause of action for wrongful death exists in such
decedent's personal representative, and such cause of action
for wrongful death cannot be defeated merely by reason of the
bar of limitation which would have been applicable to dece-
dent's action.
28
The Klema decision brings into focus the distinction between bodily
injury or medical malpractice action which the decedent would bring
before his death and the wrongful death action which the administrator
would bring after the decedent's death. The two types of actions are
distinct and independent with distinct and independent statutes of lim-
itation. Although the Klema ruling was decided prior to the recognition
of the discovery rule, that fact does not diminish the precedential value
of the holding. According to the Klema rationale, the administrator of
the decedent's estate would be able to bring a wrongful death action
despite the fact that, before his death, the decedent discovered the exis-
tence of a cause of action and failed to bring his action within the ap-
propriate statute of limitation.29 These inequities are further illustrated
by comparing Situation 2 to Situation 3, supra.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISCOVERY RULE
Actions brought under Ohio's bodily injury statute and malpractice
statute must be brought within a certain period, two and one years re-
spectively, after the cause thereof "accrued. '30 The simplest and probably
21 Klema, 170 Ohio St. at 519, 166 N.E.2d at 470.
29 Id. at 525, 166 N.E.2d at 766. In dictum, the Klema court remarked that
"had the decedent lived for more than one year after the negligent act without
having brought a malpractice action in his own behalf, his personal representative
could have brought an action for wrongful death based on such negligent act."
30 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2305.10, 2305.11(A) (Baldwin 1984). Section
2305.10 reads:
An action for bodily injury or injury to personal property shall be
brought within two years after the cause thereof arose.
For purposes of this section, a cause of action for bodily injury
caused by exposure to asbestos or to chromium in any of its chemical
forms arises upon the date on which the plaintiff is informed by com-
petent medical authority that he has been injured by such exposure,
or upon the date on which, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, he
should have become aware that he had been injured by the exposure,
whichever date occurs first.
For purposes of this section, a cause of action for bodily injury
incurred by a veteran through exposure to chemical defoliants or
herbicides or other causative agents, including agent orange, arises
upon the date on which the plaintiff is informed by competent medical
authority that he has been injured by such exposure.
As used in this section "agent orange," "causative agent," and "vet-
eran" have the same meanings as in section 5903.21 of the Revised
Code.
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harshest method of determining the accrual date was the general rule
that the "cause of action accrue[d] when the wrongful act complained of
[was] committed."' This often resulted in the statute of limitations run-
ning out before the injury manifested itself.
The first step to reducing the harshness of this rule in malpractice
cases was the adoption of a termination rule.32 The termination rule
established the accrual date for the running of the time limitation as the
date the professional relationship terminated.33 "The justification given
for the termination rule [was] that it strengthen[ed] the physician-patient
relationship [by allowing] [t]he patient to rely upon the doctor's ability
until the relationship [was] terminated" and to allow the physician to
fully treat the patient, including remedying any mistakes made.
34
However, in Wyler v. Tripi,35 the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged
that the termination rule did little for those whose injuries required a
long time to develop and that the rule bore no logical relationship to the
injury incurred.36 While recognizing that the purpose of the discovery rule
was to ameliorate the harshness of both past and existing rules for es-
For purposes of this section, a cause of action for bodily injury which
may be caused by exposure to diethylstibestrol or other nonsteroidal
synthetic estrogens, including exposure before birth, arises upon the
date on which the plaintiff learns from a licensed physician that he
has an injury which may be related to such exposure, or upon the date
on which by the exercise of reasonable diligence he should have be-
come aware that he has an injury which may be related to such ex-
posure, whichever date occurs first.
Section 2305.11(A) provides in part:
(A) An action for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false impris-
onment, or malpractice, including an action for malpractice against
a physician, podiatrist, hospital, or dentist, or upon a statute for a
penalty or forfeiture shall be brought within one year after the cause
thereof accrued, provided that an action by an employee for the pay-
ment of unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or
liquidated damages by reason of the nonpayment of minimum wages
or overtime compensation, shall be brought within two years after the
cause thereof accrued.
If a written notice, prior to the expiration of time contained in this
division, is given to any person in a medical claim that an individual
is presently considering bringing an action against that person re-
lating to professional services provided to that individual, then an
action by that individual against that person may be commenced at
any time within one hundred eighty days after that notice is given.
31 Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St. 2d 164, 166, 267 N.E.2d 419, 421 (1971).
32 Id. See also Delong v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 2, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952);
Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 124 N.E. 238 (1919); Gillette v. Tucker, 67
Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902). These cases were subsequently overruled by
Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found., 5 Ohio St. 3d 111, 449 N.E.2d 439
(1983). See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
Wyler, 25 Ohio St. 2d at 166, 267 N.E.2d at 421.
Id. at 168, 267 N.E.2d at 421 (citing Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 124
N.E. 238 (1919)).
-5 Wyler, 25 Ohio St. 2d 164, 267 N.E.2d 419.
36 Id. at 168, 267 N.E.2d at 421.
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tablishing the accrual date for statute of limitation purposes,37 the Wyler
court refused to adopt the discovery rule. The court reasoned that it would
be legislating3 8 and preferred to leave the adoption of the discovery rule
to the legislature. 39
In 1980, the Ohio General Assembly amended Section 2305.10 of the
Ohio Revised Code thereby adopting a statutory discovery rule. The "dis-
covery rule amendment" applied only to bodily injury claimants injured
by exposure to asbestos, chromium, chemical defoliants, or diethlystil-
bestrol (DES). The accrual date was established as the date on which the
plaintiff was informed by his physician or through the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence should have become aware that the injury was the result
of exposure to the above agents.40
In 1983, the Ohio Supreme Court judicially created a discovery rule
applicable to all types of bodily injury claims under Section 2305.10 and
malpractice actions under Section 2305.11. The first case to apply the
discovery rule was O'Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp.41 In O'Stricker, plain-
tiffs cancer was related to exposure to asbestos, but the action for bodily
injury was brought prior to the General Assembly's amendment to Section
2305.10. Prior to the 1980 amendment, bodily injury actions involving
exposure to toxic substances was governed by the "last exposure rule,"
which dictated that the statute of limitation begins to run upon the date
of plaintiff's last exposure. Defendant contended plaintiffs last exposure
was in 1973 and that the action would have been thus barred under the
"last exposure rule. '42 The O'Stricker court strongly emphasized the ine-
quities that would result if the plaintiffs are not permitted to bring their
actions.43
Nor would it be unfair to require defendants to collect ... doc-
umentary evidence, since such records would typically be kept
in the ordinary course of business [and] to deny plaintiff an
opportunity to pursue his claim, possibly before he knew it
existed, would only compound the personal tragedy borne by
asbestos workers and their families.44
The court applied the discovery rule to medical malpractice actions
in Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Foundation.45 After discussing the
harshness of the existing rules for determining the accrual date and how
37 See Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found., 5 Ohio St. 3d 111,449 N.E.2d
438 (1983); O'Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp., 4 Ohio St. 3d 84, 447 N.E.2d 727(1983); Amer v. Akron City Hosp., 47 Ohio St. 2d 85, 351 N.E. 479 (1979); Wyler
v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St. 2d 164, 267 N.E.2d 419 (1971).
31 Wyler, 25 Ohio St. 2d at 171, 267 N.E.2d at 423.
3 Id.
- OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Baldwin 1984). See supra note 30.
41 4 Ohio St. 3d 84, 447 N.E.2d 727 (1983).
42 Id.
- Id.
"Id. at 89, 447 N.E.2d at 731.
45 Ohio St. 3d 111, 449 N.E.2d 438 (1983). See also Skidmore & Hall v.
Rottman, 5 Ohio St. 3d 210, 450 N.E.2d 684 (1983) (discovery rule applied to legal
malpractice cause of action).
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the discovery rule is consistent with the statute of limitation's purpose
of preventing stale claims, the Oliver court, in contrast to the Wyler court,
concluded that to adopt the discovery rule did not amount to judicial
legislation. 46 Since the task of the judiciary is to define statutory terms
where the legislature has not done so, 47 establishing the date of discovery
as the accrual date was "no more judicial legislation than determining
that it [was] the time of the commission of the act. 48
Since the O'Stricker and Oliver decisions, the court has refined and
defined the scope of the discovery rule. Part of this refinement includes
combining elements of the termination rule with the discovery rule. In
Frysinger v. Leech,49 the plaintiff claimed the defendant-physician per-
manently disfigured her by negligently performing a breast reduction
surgery. Although her suit was brought within two years of the termi-
nation of the physician-patient relationship in June, 1978, it was not
brought within two years of the date of discovery, March, 1978.50 The
Frysinger court held that "the termination rule encourages the parties
to resolve their dispute without litigation, and stimulates the physician
to mitigate the patient's damages." 5' The court perceived this worthwhile
goal as justifying the retention to the termination rule, "so long as it does
not curtail the patient's right to sue after discovering the malpractice
injury. '52 The court held the statute of limitation commences "(a) when
the patient discovers or, in the reasonable care should have discovered,
the resulting injury, or (b) when the physician-patient relationship ter-
minates, whichever is later."53
The Ohio Supreme Court further refined the discovery rule in Hersch-
berger v. Akron City Hospital.54 In this case, the plaintiff was allegedly
the victim of misdiagnosis and mistreatment of thrombophlebitis in 1977.
Suffering leg discomfort after surgery, Herschberger consulted other phy-
sicians. In 1984, one physician advised Herschberger that the leg pain
was the result of the alleged misdiagnosis and mistreatment in 1977.55
The court established the accrual date as the date when the plaintiff
discovered, not merely the physical injury, but that the injury was related
to specific medical services rendered to him.5 6
IV. PERSPECTIVES ON THE APPLICATION OF THE DISCOVERY RULE TO
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS
Jurisdictions other than Ohio have relied on various justifications for
either applying the discovery rule to wrongful death actions or denying
46 Oliver, 5 Ohio St. 3d at 114, 449 N.E.2d at 442.
41Id. at 116, 449 N.E.2d at 443.
- Id.
49 Frysinger v. Leech, 32 Ohio St. 3d 38, 512 N.E.2d 337 (1987).
50 Id. at 39, 512 N.E.2d at 338.
51 Id. at 41, 512 N.E.2d at 341.
52 Id.
- Id.
4 Herschberger v. Akron City Hosp., 34 Ohio St. 3d 1, 516 N.E.2d 204 (1987).55 Id.
I Id. at 5, 516 N.E.2d at 209.
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its application. By looking to how other states have addressed this issue,
a better understanding can be gained as to why Ohio does not presently
apply the discovery rule to wrongful death actions and the various ap-
proaches that may be utilized by those seeking to have such application
permitted in Ohio courts.
A. States Denying Application Of Discovery Rule
1. Strict Statutory Construction
The primary argument for denying application of the discovery rule
is strict construction of the wrongful death statute.5 7 In Cadieux v. In-
ternational Tel. & Tel. Corp.,58 the decedent died of cancer in 1974 alleg-
edly due to exposure to microwave and X-ray radiation. After a co-worker
of the decedent died of cancer in 1975, the plaintiff-widow made the
connection between the cancer and the radiation exposure and subse-
quently filed suit in 1977.59 Interpreting the Rhode Island statute, the
circuit court refused to extend the discovery rule to wrongful death cases
despite the harshness of the decision.60 The court noted that the word
"accrued" in the negligence statute of limitation 6 1 left room for judicial
interpretation which would allow application of the discovery rule. How-
ever, the language of the Rhode Island wrongful death statute62 requiring
the actions to "be brought within two years of the death. '6 3 foreclosed
this option. The Cadieux court also recognized that Rhode Island has
consistently held that the cause of action for wrongful death is in derog-
ation of common law and "therefore not subject to judicial alteration or
expansion."6
57 See Pobieglo v. Monsanto Co., 402 Mass. 112, 521 N.E.2d 728 (1988); Trimper
v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 501 A.2d 446 (1985); With v. General Electric Co.,
653 P.2d 764 (Colo. App. 1982); Szlinis v. Moulded Fiber Glass Cos., 80 Mich.
App. 55, 263 N.W.2d 282 (1977); Walker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 320 So.2d 418
(Fla. App.), cert. dismissed, 338 So.2d 843 (Fla. 1975).
593 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1979).
59 Id. at 144.
-1d.
61 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14 (1985). The statute provides: an "[a]ction for injuries
to the person shall be commenced and sued within three (3) years next after the
cause of action shall accrue, and not after."
6 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-2 (1985). The statute states in part that "every such
action shall be commenced within two (2) years after the death of such person."
Cadieux, 593 F.2d at 144.
-Id. (citing Short v. Flynn, 374 A.2d 787 (R.I. 1977); Nascimento v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 115 R.I. 395, 346 A.2d 657 (1975); Tillinghast v. Reed, 70 R.I. 259,
38 A.2d 782 (1944)).
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2. Prevention of Stale Claims
In addition to strict construction, the dual policies of prevention of
stale claims as well as the recognition of the date of death as the starting
point for inquiry into the cause of death have been asserted as reasons
for denying application of the discovery rule to wrongful death actions.65
For example, in Krueger v. St. Joseph's Hosp.,66 the North Dakota Su-
preme Court held that the discovery rule was inapplicable since "the fact
of death itself should indicate a starting point for inquiry regarding a
cause of action for wrongful death. 67 Absent fraudulent concealment,68
"the facts used to determine whether a cause of action exists are equally
available to the plaintiff.... [T]his equality exists when death occurs,
while in malpractice actions the difficulty of ascertaining the facts in-
dicating malpractice necessitates a 'discovery rule' .69
Another court justified its refusal to adopt a discovery rule in a wrong-
ful death action on the prevention of state claims rationale.70 In DeCosse
v. Armstrong Cork Co.,71 the court noted that "[i]t is not in the public
interest ... to encourage, literally, the unearthing of wrongful death
causes of action long after the death has occurred because there is some
suspicion that death [was] caused [by a] wrongful act. '72 Application of
the discovery rule to wrongful death actions would make it impossible
for defendants to predict when a claim against them may be barred. 73
This reasoning is suspect. Under the present Ohio discovery rule, it
is impossible for defendants in bodily injury and malpractice actions to
predict when a claim against them may be barred.74 This ironic situation
permits a tortfeasor who merely injures another person to remain subject
to a lawsuit decades after his negligent act, while a tortfeasor who causes
the death of the victim can rest easy two years after his victim's death. 75
B. Jurisdictions Applying The Discovery Rule
Courts have allowed the discovery rule to trigger the statute of lim-
itation for wrongful death actions for various reasons. Some have based
See Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 501 A.2d 446 (1985); DeCosse v.
Armstrong Cork Co., 319 N.W.2d 45 (Minn. 1982); Krueger v. St. Joseph's Hosp.,
305 N.W.2d 18 (N.D. 1981).
305 N.W.2d 18 (N.D. 1981).
67 Id. at 23.
Id. at 23-24. The court ruled that the defendants were estopped from asserting
that plaintiffs action was time barred where fraud or fraudulent concealment
was involved.
69Id.
70 DeCosse v. Armstrong Cork Co., 319 N.W.2d 45 (N.D. 1982).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 52.
73 Id.
74 See generally O'Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp., 4 Ohio St. 3d 335, 447 N.E.2d
727 (1983) and Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found., 5 Ohio St. 3d 111,
449 N.E.2d 438 (1983).
75 Pobieglo v. Monsanto Co., 402 Mass. 112, 521 N.E.2d 728 (1988).
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their decisions on public policy or a sense of "fundamental fairness." Other
courts have subjected their statute of limitations provisions to constitu-
tional scrutiny.
Relying on the balancing approach articulated by a Massachusetts
court,7 6 an Illinois appellate court applied a balancing test to determine
whether the discovery rule should apply in wrongful death cases in Praz-
nik v. Sport Aero Inc.77 The Praznik plaintiff failed to bring a wrongful
death action within two years of the date of her husband's death because
the wreckage of the decedent's airplane was not found until over two
years after its disappearance. In ruling the plaintiffs wrongful death
action was not barred, the Praznik court reasoned that "the difficulty of
proof created by the passing of time [must be] balanced against the hard-
ship to the plaintiff who neither knew nor should have known the exis-
tence of a right to sue" in determining whether the discovery rule should
apply.78 This case-by-case approach struck a balance between the hard-
ships to the parties in a wrongful death action. Because the plaintiff in
Praznik suffered tremendous hardship and the defendant was not prej-
udiced by the lapse of time, the court held the discovery rule was appli-
cable.7 9
The fundamental fairness of the discovery rule and remedial nature
of the wrongful death statute supported application of the discovery rule
by the Alaska Supreme Court in Hanebuth v. Bell Helicopter Intl.0 The
plane wreckage in which plaintiffs decedent was killed was not discov-
ered until nearly eight years after the crash. In ruling that the plaintiff's
suit was not barred by the two year statute of limitations, the court
reasoned that it would be "profoundly unfair to deprive a litigant of his
right to bring a lawsuit before he has had any reasonable opportunity to
do so."' If the discovery rule were not to apply, "a tortfeasor whose conduct
[is] so grievous as to cause death would be exonerated, while another
tortfeasor, guilty of the same conduct except for the fortuity that it merely
caused injury, would be held responsible. ' 2
To explain the remedial nature of the wrongful death statutes, the
Hanebuth court, quoted Professor Sutherland, a respected authority on
statutory construction:
76 Id. at 117, 521 N.E.2d at 733. The Pobieglo court reasoned that "[tihe ap-
plication of a post-death discovery rule to survival actions would produce 'an
unacceptable imbalance between affording plaintiffs a remedy and providing de-
fendants the repose that is essential to stability in human affairs.'" Id. at 119,
521 N.E.2d at 733 (quoting Olsen v. Bell Tel. Laboratories, Inc., 388 Mass. 171,
175, 445 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1982)).
77 42 Ill. App. 3d 330, 355 N.E.2d 686 (1976).
78 Id. at 336, 355 N.E.2d at 691.
7. Id. at 337, 355 N.E.2d at 692. Compare with Pobieglo, 402 Mass. 112, 521
N.E.2d 728, where the court would always resolve the balancing test against the
plaintiff in a wrongful death action.
8o 694 P.2d 143 (Alaska 1984).
81 Id. at 147. See supra note 1.
Hanebuth, 694 P.2d at 147.
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[a wrongful death statute] represents a wholesome remedial
policy that has become firmly imbedded in modern jurisprud-
ence, and where the extent of the damages recoverable for
wrongful death is measured by the actual injury sustained,
these statutes should be liberally construed to accomplish their
remedial purpose. But many of the decisions in the past, and
a few of the later ones as well, have crippled the operation of
the legislation by employing a narrow construction on the basis
that these statutes are in derogation of the common law. How-
ever, the better and modern authorities are in agreement that
the objective and spirit of this legislation should not be
thwarted by a technical application. 83
The Hanebuth court disparaged the underlying reasons for denying
application of discovery rule to wrongful death. The court explained that
it found the wrongful death not to be in derogation of the common law
because, had there been no statute, the court would have in all likelihood
established a common law wrongful death action following the lead of
the United States Supreme Court in Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc.8 Because the statute was not in derogation of the common law, it
need not be strictly construed.85
The Illinois Appellate Court in Fure v. Sherman Hospital8 6 adopted
the discovery rule in a wrongful death action after examining prior Illinois
case law and the history of the wrongful death cause of action. The plain-
tiff's decedent in Fure was misdiagnosed as suffering from perforated
stomach ulcer and treated accordingly when, in fact, the decedent had a
perforated esophagus. The decedent eventually died of an untreated per-
forated esophagus, and the death certificate listed as the cause of death
the medical term for perforated esophagus. 7
In its examination of prior case law, the Fure court first looked to
Kenney v. Churchill Truck Lines Inc.,8 in which a suit was permitted
beyond the two-year provision because the defendant was out-of-state
serving in the United States Air Force, and it was impossible for the
plaintiff to perfect service upon the defendant.8 9 Fure then examined
Wilbon v. D.F. Bast Co.,90 in which "a wrongful death action filed on behalf
of the minor child of the decedent, and not brought within two years, was
allowed on the grounds of public policy."91 The Wilbon court cited Professor
Id. at 145-46 (quoting C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 71.05 at 337-38 (4th ed. 1973) (footnote omitted)).
Hanebuth, 694 P.2d at 145 n.9 (citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,
398 U.S. 375 (1970)). See also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
Hanebuth, 694 P.2d at 145.
64 Ill. App. 3d 259, 380 N.E.2d 1376 (1978).
1 Id. at 272, 380 N.E.2d at 1386.
6 Ill. App. 3d 983, 286 N.E.2d 619 (1972).
11 64 Ill. App. 3d at 267, 380 N.E.2d at 1383 (citing Kenney v. Chuchill Truck
Lines, Inc., 6 Ill. App. 3d 983, 286 N.E.2d 619 (1972)).
Wilbon v. D.F. Bast Co., 48 Ill. App. 3d 98, 365 N.E.2d 498 (1977).
9164 Ill. App. 3d at 267, 380 N.E.2d at 1383 (citing Wilbon, 48 Ill. App. 3d at
102, 365 N.E.2d at 500).
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Sutherland, and held that the statute should be liberally interpreted to
achieve its remedial purpose. 92 The decision in Praznik v. Sport Aero,
Inc.93 was the final case cited by the Fure court. The Praznik case pre-
sented somewhat of a factual anomaly: the wreckage of the aircraft in
which decedent was killed was not found until over two years after his
disappearance, plaintiff did not know her husband was dead until the
two-year limitations period had expired. 94 The Praznik court, in applying
the discovery rule to this wrongful death action, emphasized that the
hardship experienced by the plaintiff far outweighed the nominal prej-
udice to the defendant by the lapse of time.95
The Fure court discussed the development of the common law rule
prohibiting wrongful death actions. "[T]he greater evil [was] given a
stronger protection than the lesser, based on the survival or nonsurvival
of the victim. '96 The court concluded that a wrongful death cause of action
may be "brought more than two years after the plaintiff knows of the
death in question. '97 In arriving at this result, the court relied on prior
case law which indicated acceptable statutory construction and set forth
the public policy behind wrongful death statutes. 98
The Arizona court in Anson v. American Motors Corp.99 did not ex-
amine public policy considerations, nor have available to it, prior case
law tolling the statute of limitations when it reached the same conclusion
as the Fure court. Anson involved the wrongful death of plaintiffs son
in an automobile accident which allegedly resulted from a defective prod-
uct. The time limit for bringing the products liability action was the
general statute of limitation which established the accrual date for a
wrongful death action as the date of death.100 Plaintiff contended that
Arizona's limitations period in the wrongful death statute' 0' violated
equal protection and "open court" provisions. Arizona's constitutional
"open court" provision provided: "[t]he right of action to recover damages
for injuries shall never be abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not
be subject to any statutory limitation.' '0 2 Accepting the plaintiffs ar-
gument, the Anson court relied heavily on the Arizona Supreme Court
92 Id.
93 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
Fure, 64 Ill. App. 3d at 268, 380 N.E.2d at 1383.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 270, 380 N.E.2d at 1385.97 Fure, 64 Ill. App. 3d at 2.72, 380 N.E.2d at 1386.
98/d.
9 155 Ariz. 420, 747 P.2d 581 (1987).
100 Id.
10, ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-542 (1982) (The statute provides in part:
"[an action] shall be commenced ... within two years after the cause of action
accrues ....
2. For injuries done to the person of another when death ensues from such
injuries, which action shall be considered as accruing at the death of the party
injured.")
102 ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 13 (equal protection); ARIz. CONST. art. 18, § 6 (open
court provision which provides that "[t]he right of action to recover damages for
injuries shall never be abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be subject
to any statutory limitation.")
252 [Vol. 3:2
DISCOVERY RULE IN WRONGFUL DEATH
decision in Kenyon v. Hammer,10 3 in which the same constitutional chal-
lenges were made to a medical malpractice statute of limitations. 10 4
In holding that the right to recover for bodily injuries was funda-
mental, thus subjecting the statute to strict scrutiny, the Kenyon court
emphasized Arizona's "almost unique ... provisions regarding tort
law." 0 5 Those provisions include: 1) "a specific clause prohibiting abro-
gation of 'the right of action to recover damages. . .' and further providing
that 'the amount recovered shall not be subject to statutory limitation,'"
2) a provision prohibiting statutes "limiting the amount of damages to
be recovered for causing the death or injury of any person," 3) a provision
prohibiting labor contracts with tort immunity provision, and 4) the con-
stitutional requirement that the defenses of contributory negligence or
assumption of the risk be questions of fact within the sole purview of the
jury.10 6
Once the Kenyon court found the right to bring an action was a
"fundamental right" guaranteed by the state constitution, the court con-
cluded that "the state ha[d] neither a compelling nor legitimate interest
in providing economic relief to one segment of society by depriving those
who have been wronged to access to, and remedy by, the judicial sys-
tem."'1 7 The two year limitation provision was held violative of the equal
protection and the stricter Arizona open court provision. 108
Following Kenyon, the Anson court readily recognized that the right
to bring and pursue a wrongful death action is also fundamental, "since
the applicable constitutional provisions prohibit 'limiting the amount of
damages to be recovered' for injury or death."'0 9 The court further stated
that the general statute of limitation unfairly discriminated against
claimants who filed a wrongful death action by allowing bodily injury
claimants the benefit of the discovery rule while denying that benefit to
wrongful death claimants. 10 The Anson court concluded that the "dis-
tinction [was] not rationally related to important state interests and was
thus violative of Arizona's equal protection provision.""'
103 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961 (1984). The Kenyon court held that "imposition
of an absolute bar three years from the date of injury on most [ ] medical mal-
practice claimants, the abolition of general tolling provisions recognized for all
other tort claims and the internal distinctions between classes of medical mal-
practice claimants, all discriminate against and among medical malpractice
claimants in a manner which infringes upon fundamental rights." Id. at 87, 688
P.2d at 979.
4 ARnI. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-564(A) (1982), repealed by, Ariz. Laws 1985,
Ch. 84, § 3. The statute provided that a "cause of action for medical malpractice
against a licensed health care provider accrues as of the date of the injury ..
and with certain exceptions is barred three years thereafter.
105 Kenyon, 142 Ariz. at 79-81, 688 P.2d at 971-73.
106 Id. (citing ARiz. CONST. art. 18, § 6; art. 2, § 31; art. 18, § 3; and art. 18,
§ 5).
107 Kenyon, 142 Ariz. at 83, 688 P.2d at 975.
108 Id.
'
09 Anson, 155 Ariz. at 424, 747 P.2d 585 (citing ARiz. CONST. art. 18, § 6 and
art. II, § 31) (emphasis added).
110 Id.
III Id.
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With regard to the open courts provision, the Anson court recognized
that it is generally within the prerogative of the legislature to adopt a
statute of limitation. 112 However, pursuant to Arizona constitutional pro-
visions curtailing the legislature's power to limit damages awards, the
legislature could not abolish or abrogate causes of action, since abrogation
not only limits the amount recoverable but bars recovery completely.113
Thus a variety of judicial approaches may be utilized to allow for the
application of the discovery rule to wrongful death actions. There is ample
precedent, accommodating a variety of ideologies, for application of the
discovery rule to wrongful death actions. Attorneys and jurists in Ohio
have these precedents to draw upon when addressing the issue of appli-
cation of the discovery rule to wrongful death actions.
C. Policy and Precedents
In deciding to apply the discovery rule to wrongful death actions,
courts have focused on the remedial nature of the wrongful death statutes
and the fundamental fairness of the discovery rule." 4 The remedial nature
stems from the provision to the survivors of one killed by another's neg-
ligence the opportunity for compensation where none had previously ex-
isted at common law.11 5 The discovery rule is fundamentally fair because
a plaintiff cannot fairly be said to have sat on his right to bring an action
when he is unaware of the right to bring it.116
The next question is whether the rationales utilized by other juris-
dictions would and/or should prompt the Ohio judiciary or legislature to
adopt the discovery rule in wrongful death cases. To determine whether
the Ohio courts would recognize the remedial purpose of the wrongful
death statute and the fundamental fairness of the discovery rule as suf-
ficient justification for suspension of the two-year time limitation, it is
necessary to review the courts' views on the importance of the wrongful
death statute's remedial nature. Previously recognized exceptions to the
two year provision, as in Fure,17 would suggest that the provision is open
to judicial interpretation and supports the application of the discovery
rule in wrongful death claims.
The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that the wrongful death
statute, Section 2125.02 of the Revised Code, is remedial in nature."18
112 Id. at 425, 747 P.2d at 586.
113 See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. See also Kennedy v. Cum-
berland Engineering Co., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984) (statute that required a per-
sonal injury action based on products liability be brought within ten years of the
original sale ruled unconstitutional); Daugaard v. Baltic Coop. Bldg. Supply Ass'n,
349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1984) (statute requiring actions arising from a real property
improvement be brought within six (6) years of such construction was ruled
unconstitutional); Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (1979) (stat-
utory 12-year ban on lawsuits out of improvements to realty declared unconsti-
tutional).
114 See supra notes 68-76 and 113.
115 See supra notes 9-22 and accompanying text.
116 See supra note 1 and notes 30-56 and accompanying text.
117 See supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
118 French v. Dwiggens, 9 Ohio St. 3d 32, 458 N.E.2d 827 (1984).
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The wrongful death statute has also long been recognized as being in
derogation of common law. 119 Despite its remedial nature, Ohio has
strictly construed the wrongful death statute in keeping with the rule
that statutes in derogation of common law must be strictly construed. 120
However, the rule of strict construction of statutes in derogation of com-
mon law often supersedes the rule of suppressing the evil and advancing
the remedy by liberally construing remedial statutes. 2' The rule requir-
ing statutes in derogation of common law be strictly construed has been
criticized as lacking "analytical or philosophical justification" and lacking
"genuine probative force for the purpose of establishing what the legis-
lature intended.' 1 22
Despite the criticisms of the rule, the Ohio courts have consistently
emphasized the "derogation of common law - strict construction" rule over
the remedial purpose of the statute. 23 The Ohio courts have held the two
year limitations provision is not a "remedial limitation" but is rather "an
essential element" or "condition precedent" to bringing a wrongful death
cause of action. 24 For example, in Taylor v. Black & Decker MFG. Co., 25
the court held that the minority of the plaintiff did not suspend the two-
year provision. The decedent was killed when the mental casing of the
defendant's electric hedge trimmer became electrically charged. Nine
years later, the administratix brought a wrongful death suit on behalf of
herself and decedent's minor child. 26 The minor child was denied the
benefit of the wrongful death statute despite the fact that the minor lacked
standing to prosecute the action himself or to force the personal repre-
sentative to bring the action on his behalf. 2 7
Even fraudulent concealment will not suspend the running of the
two-year period. 2 8 In Ohio, if a tortfeasor's intentional or negligent ac-
tions are concealed for more than two years, he is rendered immune from
"stale claims.' ' 29 It is quite possible that Ohio courts have discounted the
remedial purpose of the statute in favor of the "derogation of common
law - strict construction" rule. 30
Unlike the Illinois Appellate court in Fure court, the Ohio Supreme
Court can look to no case law which has suspended the two year statute
of limitation for wrongful death, Section 2125.02(D) of the Ohio Revised
119 See, e.g., Sabol v. Pekoc, Jr., 148 Ohio St. 545, 551-52, 76 N.E.2d 84, 88
(1947).
120 Id.
121 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60.01, at 55 (4th ed.
1986).
122 Id. § 61.04, at 101.
,23 Sabol, 148 Ohio St. 545, 76 N.E.2d 84 (1947).
124 Id.
125 21 Ohio App. 3d 186, 486 N.E.2d 1173 (1984).
126 Id.
127 Id. See also Mominee v. Scherbarth, 28 Ohio St. 3d 270, 275, 503 N.E.2d
717 (1986).
128 Fee Adm'r v. Fee, 10 Ohio 470 (1841).
129 See supra note 75-76 and accompanying text.
130 See Decosse, 319 N.W.2d at 50 (quoting Schmucking v. Mayo, 183 Minn. 37,
235 N.W. 633 (1931)).
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Code.13 1 Quite the contrary, Ohio cases hold the wrongful death statute
time barred, despite fraudulent concealment and minority, which effec-
tively closes the statute to judicial interpretation.
The Ohio judiciary still holds that the wrongful death statute is in
"derogation of common law." Ohio courts should examine the circum-
stances surrounding wrongful death actions in nineteenth century Eng-
land, as well as the developments in American jurisdictions with regard
to negligence and malpractice actions. Were such an analysis undertaken,
the "derogation of common law" rationale would be rendered considerably
less persuasive.
As pointed out by Mr. Justice Harlan in Moragne, the circumstances
justifying the English courts' refusal to recognize wrongful death never
existed in the United States and ceased to exist in England soon after
Lord Campbell's Act was enacted.132 If the circumstances which prompted
the British Parliament to enact the wrongful death in "derogation of the
common law" have never existed in Ohio or the United States, what
purpose is there in continuing to rely on such rationale?
Moreover, the discovery rule has become an established principle in
the modern common law of personal injury. The discovery rule was not
the result of sweeping legislative enactment in derogation of common
law, but rather the result of a consistent and gradual progression in Ohio's
common law.133 The Ohio judiciary has applied the discovery rule to most
of the statutes of limitations related to personal injury.34 The continued
failure to recognize the discovery rule in wrongful death is thus, in a
sense, in derogation of the modern "common law" of the discovery rule
and statutes of limitations.
The gradual development of the discovery rule in recent years indi-
cates a judicial policy of more liberal statutory interpretation for the
benefit of personal injury plaintiffs. Recent legislative enactments also
indicate a more expansive approach to the rights of personal injury plain-
tiffs. 135 The Ohio wrongful death statute was amended in 1981 to allow
a surviving spouse, minor children, parents, and next of kin to recover
for mental anguish and grief.136 The failure to provide for the discovery
rule in wrongful death actions is inconsistent with the policy established
by the legislature and judiciary of expanding the opportunities for com-
pensation. To exempt the wrongful death statute from a more liberal and
remedial interpretation simply because it is in "derogation of common
law" or because death should automatically put a the plaintiff on notice
that a wrongful death claim may exist is irrational. 137
131 See Borovitz v. American Hard Rubber Co., 287 F. 368 (N.D. Ohio 1923).
The district court did recognize that the wrongful death statute was subject to
an implied exception, that in an action on behalf of alien enemies, the period of
war will be excluded from the computation of the two years.
132 See supra note 15-16 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 30-48 and accompanying text.
1' See supra notes 30-48 and accompanying text.
135 See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Baldwin 1984) (new provisions re-
garding asbestos, chromium, chemical defoliants, and synthetic estrogens).
136 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02(B)(5) (Baldwin 1987).
13 See infra notes 145 and 160-163 and accompanying text.
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D. Constitutional Challenges
Wrongful death statutes similar to Ohio's have been challenged as
violative of state and federal equal protection provisions 138 and "open-
court" or "right-to-a-remedy" provisions. 13 9
1. Equal Protection Challenge
There are three tests available to the judiciary for determining the
constitutionality of the statute under an equal protection analysis: 1)
strict scrutiny, 2) intermediate level scrutiny, and 3) rational basis. 40
The intermediate level scrutiny, used primarily in cases involving gender-
based classifications, is inapplicable to this discussion.14'
In equal protection problems, one of the first steps is to establish
classes of people who are allegedly being treated unequally. The tests
would be applied to determine whether bodily injury plaintiffs, whose
actions accrue upon discovery, and wrongful death plaintiffs, whose ac-
tions accrue upon death regardless of discovery, are being treated une-
qually in violation of equal protection clauses.
Because the classification in this instance does not affect a suspect
class, the determination of the standard of review to be applied hinges
upon whether the right to bring an action for recovery of damages is
"fundamental.' ' 2 If the right is "fundamental," strict scrutiny will be
applied. If the right is not "fundamental," rational basis will be applied.143
a. Strict Scrutiny
Is the right to recover damages for wrongful death a fundamental
right in Ohio? Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a rem-
edy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered
without denial or delay.144
The wrongful death actions are brought by the administrator or ex-
ecutor of the decedent's estate on behalf of the beneficiaries. The injuries
to the beneficiaries are injuries to their persons; separate and distin-
guishable from any action the decedent might have had.1 45 The injury to
138 See supra notes 94-108; see also Johnson v. Koppers, 524 F. Supp. 1182,
1193 (1981); Cadieux v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 593 F.2d 142, 145 (1979).
'39 See authorities cited supra note 138.
140 Kenyon, 142 Ariz. at 79, 688 P.2d at 970.
141 See Michael M. v. Sonoma County Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
142 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
14 Id. See also Board of Educ. of City School Dist. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d
368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979).
144 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16 (emphasis added).
145 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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the beneficiary, in the form of emotional distress and economic loss, are
no less injuries to their person than the same injuries are to the person
of bodily injury plaintiff. The statute allows for recovery for injury done
to the persons of the beneficiaries in the form of mental anguish incurred
by the beneficiaries. 146 Under section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution,
the Ohio courts must be open to a plaintiff in a wrongful death action to
allow him to recover "for injury done him in his ... person."
Ohio courts have long held that the right of access to the courts is a
"fundamental" right.147 If the Ohio Supreme Court were to recognize as
fundamental the right of wrongful death plaintiffs to access to the court,
the two-year time limitation could be required to withstand strict scru-
tiny; i.e., the provision would have to be necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest.'4
Because of the lack of recorded legislative history dating back to 1851,
it is difficult to determine exactly what concerns prompted the Ohio Gen-
eral Assembly to adopt the wrongful death statute's two-year provision.
The legislature does, however, have an interest in protecting defendants
from stale claims. Whether the prevention of stale claims is a compelling
government interest, is another question entirely.
Since the discovery rule applies to medical malpractice actions or
bodily injury claims, the injured party can bring a "stale" claim long after
the negligent act was committed. The wrongful death statute precludes
stale claims by requiring "all actions.., be commenced within two years
after a decedent's death.'' 49 In contrast, the language of the bodily injury
statute permits judicial interpretations and allows application of the dis-
covery rule because it requires that the "action... be brought within two
years after the cause thereof arose. '150
A wrongful death plaintiff would argue that if protection of defendants
from stale claims were truly a compelling state interest, the legislature
would have amended the malpractice and bodily injury statutes to elim-
inate the "accrual" language and provide defendants protection in accord
with the "compelling state interest." Elimination of the "accrual" lan-
guage would foreclose the judicial application of the discovery rule and
thus provide defendants with genuine protection from stale claims. How-
ever, even if the Ohio legislature were to take such action, the Ohio courts
might follow the lead of the Arizona court in Kenyon which found the
state interests were not compelling, even in the face of evidence of a
medical malpractice crisis.151
1OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02(B) (Baldwin 1987).
147 See Knitz v. Harringer, 99 Ohio St. 240, 124 N.E. 168 (1919); Baltimore &
Ohio Ry. v. Stankard, 56 Ohio St. 224, 232, 46 N.E. 577, 599 (1897) ("the right
to appeal to the courts for the redress of wrongs is one of those rights which are
in their nature, under our Constitution inalienable, and cannot be thrown off or
bargained away."); Brown v. Best, 44 Ohio App. 2d 82, 335 N.E.2d 734 (1974);
Armstrong v. Duffy, 90 Ohio App. 233, 103 N.E.2d 760 (1951).
4 8 Kenyon, 144 Ariz. at 79, 688 P.2d at 970 (citing San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)).
,9 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2125.02(D) (Baldwin 1987).
15 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Baldwin 1984).
151 Kenyon, 144 Ariz. at 79, 688 P.2d at 970.
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Even if preventing stale claims is deemed compelling, the statute
must be necessary to achieve that purpose. The Anson court pointed out
that the distinction between bodily injury plaintiffs and wrongful death
plaintiffs, based upon a scheme which allows the discovery rule to apply
in the former action but not the latter, is "arbitrary and unreasonable"
and "is not rationally related to important state interests.'
152
There is case law in Ohio which supports the proposition that the
right to sue in the courts for damages for injuries is not fundamental. 153
In Board of Educ. of City School Dist. v. Walter,15 4 the Ohio Supreme Court
rejected the definition of "fundamental" right set forth in San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez.155 In Walter, the plaintiffs brought a
class action suit challenging Ohio's system of financing public education.
They contended that the statutory system was in violation of federal and
state equal protection clauses and was subject to strict scrutiny because
the right to education was a fundamental right.156 Unlike Rodriquez, the
Walter court held that the right is not "fundamental" simply because it
is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the constitution 157 and stated:
[W]e reject the 'Rodriquez test' for determining which rights
are fundamental. While the test may have some applicability
in determining which rights are fundamental under the Con-
stitution of the United States, it is not helpful in determining
whether a right is fundamental under the Ohio Constitution. 158
Such a rationale would allow Ohio courts to hold that the right of access
to the courts is not fundamental and thus not subject to strict scrutiny
regardless of the fact that it is expressly provided for in the Ohio Con-
stitution.
b. Rational Basis
If Ohio courts declared the right of access to the courts less than a
"fundamental" right, then the rational basis test would be applied under
equal protection analysis to determine the constitutionality of the wrong-
ful death act's two year provision. 159 Under the rational basis test, the
courts must determine 1) whether the distinction between classes of plain-
tiffs is wholly irrelevant to the state's objectives'60 or 2) whether it was
152 Anson, 155 Ariz. at 423, 747 P.2d at 585.
153 See Johnson v. Koppers, 524 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ohio 1981); Schwan v.
Riverside Methodist Hosp., 6 Ohio St. 3d 300, 452 N.E.2d 1337 (1983); Board of
Educ. of City School Dist. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979);
Elizabeth Gamble Deaconess Home v. Turner Constr., 14 Ohio App. 3d 281, 470
N.E.2d 950 (1984).
1 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979).
155 411 U.S 1, 33 (1973).
- 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813.
157 Id. at 374-75, 390 N.E.2d at 819.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Kenyon, 144 Ariz. at 79, 688 P.2d at 970 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 425 (1961)).
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unreasonable for the legislature to believe the distinction to be relevant. 161
If the distinction is found to be either wholly irrelevant or unreasonable,
the statute will be held to violate equal protection under the rational
basis test, notwithstanding a general presumption of validity accorded to
statutes.
162
A rational basis test was applied by the Ohio Supreme Court in
Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp.163 and Mominee v. Scherbarth'M with
regard to the "minority tolling provision" of Section 2305.11 of the Ohio
Revised Code, the medical malpractice statute. 65 In Schwan, the appellee
was fourteen years old when he was allegedly negligently treated by the
defendant-hospital. He filed suit two and a half years later, at age sixteen.
The lower court ruled that the minor's action was barred by the one year
malpractice statute of limitations and that the minor did not fall within
the tolling provision of Section 2305.11(B). The appellee challenged the
constitutionality of this provision on equal protection grounds. 66 The
Schwan court found that the Section 2503.11(B) created "a distinction -
without reasonable grounds - between medical malpractice plaintiffs
who are younger than ten years of age and those older than ten but still
minors.' ' 67 The court stated, "a child whose cause of action accrues on
the day before his tenth birthday may file an action anytime until his
fourteenth birthday. Yet, if the same cause of action accrued on the day
161 Id. (citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111-12 (1979)).
162 Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32 Ohio St. 3d 45, 48, 512 N.E.2d 626, 629 (1987).
163 6 Ohio St. 3d 300, 452 N.E.2d 1337 (1983).
164 228 Ohio St. 3d 270, 502 N.E.2d 717 (1986).
165 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Baldwin 1984). Section 2305.11 provides
in pertinent part:
(A) An action for *** malpractice, including an action for malprac-
tice against a physician, podiatrist, hospital, or dentist, *** shall be
brought within one year after the cause thereof accrued ....
(B) In no event shall any medical claim against a physician, po-
diatrist, or a hospital or a dental claim against a dentist be brought
more than four years after the act or omission constituting the alleged
malpractice occurred. The limitations on this section for filing such a
malpractice action against a physician, podiatrist, hospital, or dentist
apply to all persons regardless of legal disability and notwithstanding
section 2305.16 of the Revised Code, provided that a minor who has
not attained his tenth birthday shall have until his fourteenth birth-
day in which to file an action for malpractice against a physician or
hospital.
Another statutory provision addresses the tolling of the statute of
limitations when the claimant is within the age of minority. Section
2305.16 of the Ohio Revised Code states that "[u]nless otherwise spe-
cially provided in sections 2305.04 to 2305.14, inclusive, and sections
1302.98 and 1304.29 of the Revised Code, if the person entitled to
bring any action mentioned in such sections ... is, at the time the
cause of action accrues, within the age of minority, .. . such person
may bring it within the respective times limited by such sections,
after such disability is removed."
'
6 Schwan, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 300-01, 452 N.E.2d at 1337-38.
167 Id. at 302, 452 N.E.2d at 1339.
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after the child's tenth birthday," the one year provision would control.
168
Both the Schwan and Mominee courts found section 2305.11(B) "ir-
rational" and "patently arbitrary," thus constitutionally infirm under the
rational basis test.169 Since a minor with no standing to sue could be
barred before the age of majority, the statute was found to effectively
violate the "open court" provision of Section 16, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution. 170
The same rationale could be applied to the distinction between bodily
injury plaintiffs and wrongful death plaintiffs to render the different
treatment of these two groups of plaintiffs "irrational" and "patently
arbitrary," and thus invalid under the rational basis test. For example,
the cause of action for a person injured and completely incapacitated has
yet to accrue on the day before his death. The injured person might live
for decades before the action accrued; before he discovers that his injuries
are the result of someone's negligent or intentional act. Yet on the day
after death, the cause of action is deemed to have accrued, and the two
year statute of limitation applies. The family members, who prior to the
decedent's death were unaware that the decedent's fatal injuries were the
result of negligence, are not somehow made aware that a cause of action
exists because the injured person died. The application of the Schwan
rationale to this scenario would support a finding that the statute violates
the equal protection clause. 171
If the right-to-a-remedy provision is found to be fundamental, the
statute can be challenged under the strict scrutiny test as it applies to
wrongful death plaintiffs who fail to discover the wrongful nature of their
decedents' deaths. 172 The rational basis test would apply if the right-to-
a-remedy is deemed not fundamental. The statute could still be chal-
lenged, as the distinction made between bodily injury plaintiffs, whose
actions accrue upon discovery, and wrongful death plaintiffs, whose cause
of action accrue at death, could be found so "irrational" and "patently
arbitrary," that no legislature could have rationally believed the statute
would serve its purpose. 173
2. Open Court/Right-To-A-Remedy Challenge
Wrongful death statutes requiring an action to be brought within two
years of the date of death even if the wrongful nature of the death was
not discovered until beyond the two year period have been challenged as
violative of "open court" provisions of state constitutions.1 74 Ohio has
struck down a number of statutes as violative of the "right-to-a-remedy/
168 Id.
169 Mominee, 28 Ohio St. at 275, 503 N.E.2d at 721.
170 Id.
171 See supra notes 157-160 and accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 140-146 and accompanying text.
173 See supra notes 152-162 and accompanying text.
174 See, e.g., Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985); Anson v. Amer-
ican Motors Corp., 155 Ariz. 420, 747 P.2d 581 (1987); Johnson v. Koppers Co.,
524 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
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open court"'7 5 provision found in Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Con-
stitution.17 6 The most recent case in which the Ohio Supreme Court has
struck down a statute as violative of Section 16, Article I was Hardy v.
VerMeulen.177
In Hardy, two surgical procedures were performed on the plaintiffs
right ear in 1973 and 1974. The malpractice injury was not discovered
until April, 1985. The lower court dismissed the plaintiff's suit as barred
by Section 2305.11(B), since the appellant failed to bring his action within
four years following the act or omission constituting the alleged mal-
practice as required by the statute.17 8 The statute challenged in Hardy
was Ohio's four year medical malpractice statute of limitations; the same
statute at issue in Schwan and Mominee. 79 The statute was challenged
as unconstitutional as applied to all medical malpractice plaintiffs, not
just minors, who did not know or could not reasonably have known of
their injuries. 80
The Hardy court quoted Lafferty v. Shinn""' which stated that "it is
not within the power of the legislature to abridge the period within which
existing right may also be so asserted as that there shall not remain a
reasonable time within which an action may be commenced.' '8 2 The Hardy
court continued, "[i]f the legislature may not constitutionally enact an
unreasonable statute of limitations, it follows that the legislature cannot
deprive one of a right before it accrues. 18 3 The court also reasoned that
"[w]hen the Constitution speaks of remedy and injury to person, property,
or reputation, it requires an opportunity granted at a meaningful time
in a meaningful manner."'84 The court concluded that "[tihe right-to-a-
remedy provision of Section 16, Article I does not require the analysis of
rational basis that is used to decide due process or equal protection ar-
guments against the constitutionality of legislation.' 1 5 Thus, the legis-
175 See Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32 Ohio St. 3d 45, 512 N.E.2d 626 (1987); Primes
v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975) (Ohio Guest Statute found to
violate Section 16, Article I, "in that it closes the courts and denies a remedy by
due course of the law to some but not all the people of the state."); Williams v.
Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949) (denial of
remedy to unborn viable child violated Section 16, Article I).
176 Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides: "All courts shall be
open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his land, goods, person, or
reputation, shall have a remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice
administered without denial or delay."177 32 Ohio St. 3d 45, 512 N.E.2d 626 (1987).
178 Id.
179 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11(B) (Baldwin 1984). This section provides
in part: "In no event shall any medical claim against a physician, podiatrist, or
hospital be brought more than four years after the act or omission constituting
the alleged malpractice occurred."
180 Hardy, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 47, 512 N.E.2d at 629.
181 38 Ohio St. 47 (1882).
182 Hardy, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 47, 512 N.E.2d at 628 (quoting Lafferty, 38 Ohio
St. at 48).18 32 Ohio St. 2d at 47, 512 N.E.2d at 628.
18 Id. (emphasis added) (agreeing with the reasoning of Daugaard v. Baltic
Coop. Bldg. Supply Ass'n., 349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1984)).
1- Id. at 48, 512 N.E.2d at 629.
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lature may not deny a legal remedy even if it has a rational basis.186
A comparison of Ohio wrongful death statute and the medical mal-
practice statute of limitations, Section 2503.11(B) of the Revised Code,
reveals that the wrongful death statute's two year provision bars the
claims of plaintiffs who did not know or could not reasonably have known
of their injuries in much the same way that the limitations period in the
malpractice statute barred similarly situated medical malpractice claim-
ants. Application of the discovery rule to wrongful death actions is the
only way to give wrongful death plaintiffs the opportunity to assert their
rights in a meaningful time in a meaningful manner.
A wrongful death defendant will contend that the right to bring this
claim exists only if the action is commenced within two years of death. 187
This approach may be labeled a "condition precedent" approach, because
bringing the action within two years has been held to be a condition
precedent to the existence of the right to bring the wrongful death ac-
tion.1 88 If not commenced within two years, there exists no right to bring
an action and, thus, no right to be given protection under Section 16,
Article I.
Such "condition precedent" rationale could have been utilized by the
Hardy court to exempt from Section 16, Article I protection, medical
malpractice plaintiffs who failed to discover their injuries within four
years.189 Under the above rationale the bringing of a medical malpractice
action within four years from the date of the negligent act could be con-
sidered a condition precedent to the existence of the right to bring the
action. Under the condition precedent rationale, the plaintiffs right to
bring an action would not exist because it was not brought within the
four year limitation period. Despite the charge by the dissent in Hardy
that the majority was failing to give adequate emphasis to the "existing
right" language of Lafferty v. Shinn, the court found the statute denying
the existence of the right, Section 2305.11(B) to be in violation of Section
16, Article 1.190 If such "condition precedent/existing right" rationale were
to apply to all similar statutes of limitations, Section 16, Article I chal-
lenges could never be made, as the only persons having standing would
be deemed to fall outside the protection of the right-to-a-remedy provision.
Wrongful death plaintiffs challenging Section 2125.02(D) as violative
of the right-to-a-remedy provision of the Ohio Constitution must contend
with defendants' claims that the injuries sustained by the wrongful death
plaintiffs are not injuries to one's "land, goods, person, or reputation"
under Section 16, Article I. This is a difficult argument for wrongful death
plaintiffs to refute. The bodily injury is to the decedent, not to the ben-
eficiaries. However, it can be argued that because the wrongful death
statute permits recovery for mental anguish suffered by the beneficiaries,
the statute already provides a right to recover for injuries to the person.191
1Id.
187 See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
188 Id.
189 See Hardy, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 52, 512 N.E.2d at 633 (Wright, J., dissenting
in part).
19o See supra note 180.
191 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02(B)(5) (Baldwin 1987).
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The wrongful death statute also allows recovery for the same losses in-
curred by decedent or the beneficiaries had the decedent only been the
victim of bodily injury. 192 That would bolster the argument that these are
losses to the "person" in the wrongful death context in just the same way
as they are losses to the "person" in the bodily injury context.
The wrongful death plaintiff must show that the right to bring a
wrongful death action is an "existing" right regardless of whether or not
it is brought within two years, and that any injury suffered by a wrongful
death plaintiff is an "injury done him in his land, goods, person, or rep-
utation" as required by the right-to-a-remedy provision. If a wrongful
death plaintiff is successful in overcoming these challenges, the wrongful
death statute can be struck down as violative of Section 16, Article I.
Even though the legislature may have a rational basis for the two year
provision, it can be struck down if it denies the opportunity to assert a
right of action at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner. 9 3
V. A 1981 OHIo FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT'S VIEW OF THE ISSUE
One of the greatest hurdles a wrongful death plaintiff will have in
persuading the court to apply the discovery rule to wrongful death actions
is the 1981 decision in Johnson v. Koppers Co. 9 4 The cause of death in
Johnson was the result of asbestos exposure. The plaintiffs did not bring
wrongful death actions until over two years after the decedents' deaths.
The district court was forced to address the issue of whether, under Ohio
law, the discovery rule was applicable to wrongful death action where
the underlying theories were negligence and strict products liability.195
Although the Johnson decision it is not binding on the state courts of
Ohio, 1' it is persuasive authority. According to the district court's anal-
ysis of the relevant state cases, Ohio would not permit the application of
the discovery rule to wrongful death action. 197
In Johnson, the court first addressed the issue of whether the "two
years from the (date of death" provision was violative of the "right-to-a-
remedy" provision in the state constitution.198 The court stated that Sec-
tion 16, Article I, applied only to "wrongs recognized by law."'99 Actions
not filed within the two years of the date of death are "not recognized by
law."200 The Johnson court concluded that the two year requirement is a
192 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02(B)(1) and (3) (expected earning capacity
and loss of society).
193 See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
194 524 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ohio 1981); see also Bazdar v. Koppers Co., 524 F.
Supp. 1194 (N.D. Ohio 1981). Bazdar was decided the same day as Johnson, and
the opinion is identical to Johnson in all relevant respects.195 Johnson, 524 F. Supp. at 1182.
196 Id.
197 Id.198 Id. at 1188.
19 Id. (citing Building Serv. & Maintenance Union v. St. Luke's Hosp., 11 Ohio
Misc. 218, 227 N.E.2d 265 (1987)).
- Id.
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restriction qualifying the right of action, not a time limitation. 20 1
The Johnson court, however, did not discuss Ohio state court decisions
which have struck down statutes that imposed restrictions qualifying the
right of action and that were held violative of the "open court/right-to-a-
remedy" provision.20 2 In Primes v. Tyler, the Ohio Guest Statute20 3 was
struck down as violative of Section 16, Article I, because it acted as a
qualification upon the right to bring an action.20 4 The qualification struck
down by the Primes court precluded a plaintiff from bringing an action
against an automobile driver if the plaintiff had been a passenger in the
vehicle .205
One of the grounds the Johnson court relied upon was the "condition
precedent"/"not-an-existing-right" rationale.20 6 The district court held
that Ohio's "right-to-a-remedy" provision was inapplicable because the
provision referred to only "wrongs recognized by law. '20 7 A wrongful death
action not commenced within two years of the date of death was not a
"wrong recognized by law."208 In both Hardy and Mominee, the Ohio Su-
preme Court has since ruled that Section 16, Article I is applicable to
protect rights which were not "existing rights. '20 9 The rights in Hardy
and Mominee were neither "existing rights"210 nor "wrongs recognized by
law."
The Johnson court also addressed the due process and equal protection
challenges to the two-year limitation.211 The court, without citing any
precedential authority, held the right of access to the courts was not
fundamental and thus access could be hindered if the legislation had a
rational basis.212 The Johnson court further found that the limitation in
wrongful death actions was rationally related to its purpose.213
Subsequent to the Johnson decision, the Ohio Supreme Court, in
Hardy, held that the right of access to the courts is fundamental and
201 Id.
202 See Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975); Williams
v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 2d 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949) (The
denial of remedy to an unborn viable child violated Section 16, Article I because
it qualified the right of action and restricted it to those already born.)
203 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4515.02 (Baldwin 1983). The Ohio Guest Statute
provides:
The owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of a motor
vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to
or death of a guest, resulting from the operation of said motor vehicle,
while such guest is being transported without payment therefore in
or upon said motor vehicle, unless such injuries or death are caused
by the willful or wanton misconduct of such operator, owner, or person
responsible for the operation of said motor vehicle.204 Primes, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723.
205 Id.
20 524 F. Supp. at 1188.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Hardy, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 47, 512 N.E.2d 628-29; Mominee, 28 Ohio St. 3d
274-75, 503 N.E.2d at 722.
210 Id.
211 Johnson, 524 F. Supp. at 1193.
212 Id.213 Johnson, 524 F. Supp. at 1193.
1989-90] 265
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
cannot be denied even if the legislature acts with a rational basis.214 The
distinction between wrongful death plaintiffs and bodily injury plaintiffs
has sharpened since the Johnson decision, with the recognition of the
discovery rule in O'Stricker and Oliver.215 Unlike wrongful death plain-
tiffs, the medical malpractice and bodily injury plaintiffs may bring ac-
tions, by virtue of the discovery rule, long after the negligent act.216 The
growing disparity between the court's treatment of wrongful death claim-
ants and malpractice and bodily injury claimants brings into question
whether Section 2125.02(D)'s two year provision can survive equal pro-
tection-rational basis scrutiny. The failure of the classifications in Schwan
and Mominee to pass rational basis scrutiny adds credence to the argu-
ment that the distinction made between bodily injury plaintiffs and
wrongful death plaintiffs is equally "irrational" and "patently arbi-
trary.' 217
VI. CONCLUSION
One reason given to justify the disparate treatment of the wrongful
death claimants is that death automatically puts one on notice to inquire
as to possible negligence.21 Under the discovery rule, injury only nomi-
nally less severe, such as quadriplegia or severe irreversible brain dam-
age, that results from medical malpractice does not entail automatic
notice of possible negligence. Is death somehow sufficiently more severe
than the most severe non-fatal injuries to automatically put the decedent's
survivors on notice of possible malpractice? The determination whether
the fatal injury should have put the patient on notice of possible medical
malpractice can just as easily be made by the jury in the wrongful death
context.
A variety of reasons are generally given to justify the imposition of
statutes of limitations. Requiring that actions be brought within a certain
period of time protects defendants from stale claims,21 9 provides defend-
ants repose and stability in their lives, 220 and deters plaintiffs from sitting
on their rights.22' In the absence of statutes of limitations, the court
system would be inundated with cases involving stale evidence and faulty
memories.
222
The fundamental fairness and remedial purpose of the discovery rule
were sufficiently compelling to outweigh the traditional justifications for
the malpractice and bodily injury statutes of limitations.223 There is no
214 Hardy, 32 Ohio St. at 48, 512 N.E.2d at 629.
215 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.
217 See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
218 See supra note 6, notes 17-29, and note 67 and accompanying text.
219 See supra note 65 and notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
220 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
221 See supra note 65 and notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
22 See generally note 70-72 and accompanying text.
23 Seesupra note 42 and notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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purpose uniquely peculiar to the wrongful death statute's two-year lim-
itations period that would prevent application of the discovery rule to
Section 2125.02(D). Conversely, there is no purpose unique to the dis-
covery rule that would allow its application to malpractice and bodily
injury statutes of limitations and at the same time prohibit its application
to the wrongful death statute's two-year provision.
What supposedly sets the wrongful death statute apart from the mal-
practice and bodily injury statutes is the fact that it is in "derogation of
common law." The distinction has lost its substance. The right of survivors
to recover for the wrongful death of a family member is unquestionably
accepted in all American jurisdictions. It cannot be doubted that if all
wrongful death statutes were repealed today, a common law wrongful
death action would be recognized tomorrow.
The general impact of the discovery rule on wrongful death actions
is best illustrated by discussing the impact on the medical profession of
the discovery rule's application to wrongful death actions. Presently the
discovery rule as outlined and refined in Oliver v. Kaiser Community
Health Foundation,224 Herschberger v. Akron City Hosp.,225 and Frysinger
v. Leech 226 would leave the physician vulnerable to a medical malpractice
suit until the patient discovers or reasonably should discover; 1) that he
has sustained injury and 2) the injury is related to the act constituting
malpractice.
Turning to the argument that the application of the discovery rule
to wrongful death actions would result in stale claims being brought
against physicians, a physician would not be required to defend against
suits any more stale than must already be defended against under the
discovery rule as it applies to medical malpractice actions. Whether the
action is a stale medical malpractice action or a stale wrongful death
action, the action is nonetheless stale.
In an action brought for wrongful death, the decedent is obviously
unavailable to assist in determining the facts or date of negligence. How-
ever, the plaintiff may be similarly unavailable in medical malpractice
or bodily injury suit by virtue of mental or physical incapacitation. Thus,
the rationale does not justify the disparate treatment of the two classes
of plaintiffs.
To extend the discovery rule to wrongful death actions, the Ohio
judiciary must attack long-standing decisional law. The courts possess a
variety of weapons with which to launch this attack. The most funda-
mental approach would be to reject the "derogation of common law" con-
cept and place greater emphasis on the remedial purpose of the wrongful
death statute. Adoption of this "remedial purpose" approach would be a
less drastic means of changing the present state of the law than a con-
stitutional attack on the statute. However, the harsh injustices resulting
from the failure to apply the discovery rule to wrongful death actions
224 S. M. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 1:9 (2d ed. 1975).
225 5 Ohio St. 3d 111, 449 N.E.2d 438 (1983).
226 34 Ohio St. 3d 1, 516 N.E.2d 204 (1987).
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would certainly warrant a constitutional attack on Section 2125.02(D)'s
two-year provision. Regardless of the approach utilized, an effective at-
tack may be made on the wrongful death statute's two-year statute of
limitations provisions to ensure that its harsh injustices are ameliorated.
True to the spirit of Chief Justice Celebrezze's remarks in Amer,227 the
Ohio Supreme Court, which is responsible for the administration of jus-
tice, must remedy this "absurdity" in the law.
228
Edward J. Leonard
227 32 Ohio St. 3d 38, 512 N.E.2d 337 (1987).
228 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
